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It is a commonly held view in contemporary epistemology that for having 
knowledge it is necessary to have an appropriately based belief, although 
numerous different views exist about when a belief’s base is appropriate. 
Broadly speaking, they all share the view that one can only have knowl-
edge if the belief’s base is in some sense truth-related or tracking the 
truth. Baseless knowledge can then be deﬁ ned as knowledge where the 
belief is acquired and sustained in a way that does not track the truth. I 
will argue that rejecting baseless knowledge leads to controversial con-
sequences. The problem increases if we consider contrasting persons who 
know because of appropriate belief forming processes but who fail to pos-
sess further epistemic virtues such as understanding. I will not argue 
which belief bases constitute a sufﬁ cient condition for knowledge. Rather 
I will stress the point that the common assumption that an appropriate 
basing relation constitutes a necessary condition for knowledge has con-
troversial consequences.
Keywords: Basing relation, externalism, reliabilism, sensitivity, 
safety, virtue epistemology.
1. Baseless knowledge
Overview: First, I will present two examples of persons to whom it is 
prima facie not implausible to ascribe knowledge, although their be-
liefs are not appropriately based. Second, I will show that the claim 
that these persons do not know becomes even more controversial if we 
consider contrasting persons to whom knowledge accounts typically as-
cribe knowledge that assume a basing relation as necessary for know-
ing. Third, I will illustrate in more detail, why prominent externalist 
knowledge accounts are committed to strongly afﬁ rming that baseless 
knowledge does not exist. Those accounts that I will discuss are pro-
cess-reliabilism, sensitivity, safety and virtue epistemology. I will ar-
gue that these accounts not only face a problem if baseless knowledge 
clearly exists, they have already counter-intuitive consequences if the 
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existence of baseless knowledge is prima facie disputable. Fourth, I will 
compare my cases to Lehrer’s gypsy lawyer case and, ﬁ fth, I will argue 
why we cannot understand the presented cases of baseless knowledge 
as instances of causal overdetermination or pseudo-overdetermination 
as one might suggest.
Here are two cases where it seems controversial to deny knowledge 
although the beliefs are not appropriately based:
Case 1: The obsessed detective
Inspector X is an ambitious and passionate detective at a police 
department. Mrs Charming has been murdered and X is commis-
sioned to catch her murderer. X visits her home to meet her hus-
band Mr Charming. At the very moment of seeing Mr Charming for 
the ﬁ rst time X has the intuition that Charming murdered his wife. 
X becomes immediately convinced that Charming is the murderer, 
although Charming is a very handsome, distinguished and popular 
person and nobody else but X believes that he could have committed 
the crime. X starts seeking for evidence that Charming murdered 
his wife, but since Charming is also smart, X cannot ﬁ nd any piece 
of evidence for years. Over the years, X becomes obsessed with this 
case. She is totally convinced that Charming killed his wife and 
nothing, not even evidence to the contrary, could change her con-
viction anymore. After years, X ﬁ nds the gun that is evidently the 
murder weapon and there are only Charming’s ﬁ ngerprints on it. X 
has hereby proven that Charming murdered his wife. She can easily 
convince all her colleagues and the rest of the world. X gets a promo-
tion and becomes a legend of her department.
Case 2: The obsessed scientist
Since she was a young boy O wanted to become a scientist like her 
hero Albert Einstein. O fulﬁ ls her dream and becomes professor of 
physics. However, O is not as successful as she dreamt of as a young 
boy. Like many colleagues, she is investigating a physical phenome-
non  that has not been explained yet, but without any success. One 
evening, O is kissed by the muse and has the intuition that there ex-
ists an undiscovered subatomic particle, whose features explain . 
O is enthusiastic about this idea, since the particle could be named 
after her, she would become immortal in the scientiﬁ c community, 
and her childhood dream would come true. However, the particle 
is hard to ﬁ nd and O gets more and more obsessed with proving its 
existence until her obsession reaches a point, where nothing, not 
even evidence to the contrary, could change her conviction anymore. 
Finally, O can perform the decisive experiment that proves the ex-
istence of the sought-after particle. The particle becomes called the 
O-particle and O receives the Nobel prize for this discovery.1
1 Klein (2012) presents a similar example of an astronomer who acquires a true 
belief about the moon by misunderstanding a conversation between two students, 
but then successfully proves that the believed proposition is true.
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Further cases of obsessed believers can easily be created. Inspector X 
has proven that Charming murdered his wife and she received all the 
merits for her achievement. Professor O has proven the existence of the 
sub-atomic particles and was awarded the Nobel-prize. Does X know 
that Charming murdered his wife? Does O know that the particles ex-
ist? I think one intuition is that they do not know before ﬁ nding evi-
dence, but that they know after having found evidence. Accordingly, 
adequate theories of knowledge should capture this intuition. Remark-
ably, nearly all contemporary accounts on knowledge are committed 
to claiming that it is clearly the case that they still do not know after 
having found evidence.
I will call any kind of reason or cause for holding or sustaining a 
belief its base, including mental states as well as external factors such 
as states, events or processes that cause a belief.2 I deﬁ ned baseless 
knowledge as knowledge where the belief is acquired and sustained in 
a way that does not track the truth. According to this deﬁ nition, knowl-
edge of obsessed believers as in the case of inspector X and professor O 
is an instance baseless knowledge.3
In what follows, I will mainly discuss the case of professor O. Obvi-
ously, we obtain the same results for detective X. O has a strong convic-
tion and possesses clear evidence. However, her beliefs are only based 
on her intuitions and not on this evidence. One reason why we seek evi-
dence or justiﬁ cation is that we want to base new beliefs on it. In this 
respect, persons who are already totally convinced about a proposition, 
but still keep seeking for evidence for it might be practically incoher-
ent. However, there are epistemic contexts, as in the two examples of 
the inspector and the scientist, where we seek evidence for the purpose 
of proving the truth of our convictions to others, but not for basing our 
own beliefs on it. In these contexts, which involve a social component, 
it is rational to seek evidence, even after having acquired an unchange-
able conviction.
Let’s suppose further that O has strong intuitions and acts accord-
ing to them but that her intuitions are not truth-conducive in any sense, 
i.e. her intuitions are not more likely to be true than mere guessing.4 
Under this assumption, the following holds:
R: O’s intuitions are not reliable belief forming processes.
R can be strengthened by assuming that O’s intuitions are even unreli-
able belief forming processes such that mere guessing is more likely to 
be true than her intuitions.
Moreover, O is a totally obsessed believer and would not change her 
beliefs under any circumstances. This obsession can be characterised 
by the following counterfactual claims:
2 Here, I follow the terminology of Williamson (2000, and 2009).
3 The notion of baseless knowledge is used by Turri (2011).
4 I do not assume a particular concept of intuitions here.
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CF1: O would believe that the particles exist, if they did not exist. 
CF2: O would believe that the particles exist, if she did not perform 
   any verifying experiment. 
CF3: O would believe that the particles exist, if she or someone else 
   did perform an experiment that proves the contrary.
The counterfactual conditional CF1 is true, since O holds her belief only 
because of her intuitions. Her belief is not caused by the facts that 
make her belief true. CF2 is true because the intuitions are completely 
causally independent from the process of seeking and ﬁ nding evidence.
CF3 is normally a stronger claim than CF2 because persons who be-
lieve that p for a reason despite evidence against it usually also believe 
that p, if there is no evidence. However, the opposite implication does 
not hold. CF3 holds, if O is so obsessed with her convictions that she 
is psychologically unable to revise her views. This can be the case if 
proving the truth of her intuitions is for some psychological reason so 
important to her that she would go insane if she did ﬁ nd evidence that 
her convictions are false.5
O is prejudiced. She would hold her belief without any evidence and 
she would even sustain her belief despite evidence to the contrary. In 
this respect, she violates two rules of rationality: ﬁ rst, that one should 
believe only if one has reasons or justiﬁ cation for believing, and second, 
that one should not believe if one has evidence to the contrary. Vio-
lating the second rule is more serious than violating the ﬁ rst one. In 
this respect, O is not an ideal rational agent. However, in evaluating 
the epistemic circumstances of O it is important to note that CF1-CF3 
are only counterfactual conditionals. Whenever we consider them, we 
consider something that is not the case. In the actual world, O proved 
that the subatomic particles exist. In the actual world, she does not be-
lieve despite her beliefs being false, her ﬁ nding no evidence or her ﬁ nd-
ing evidence to the contrary. Considering different possible worlds for 
evaluating the actual world, is, of course, a usual move in philosophy. 
However, I doubt that we would do this outside philosophical contexts 
in clear cases of praiseworthy discoveries. It seems implausible that 
in non-philosophical contexts we determine whether Albert Einstein 
knows that E = mc2 by asking whether he believes this in another pos-
sible world where he did not ﬁ nd the proof or did ﬁ nd a proof to the 
contrary. I think in non-philosophical contexts we do not put that much 
emphasize on counterfactual situations.
The counterfactual claims CF1-CF3 aim at illustrating that there is 
no appropriate causal relation between the beliefs and their truthmak-
ers or between the evidence and the belief. However, one could object 
that we cannot adequately capture causal relations by using counter-
factual claims. Taking this objection into account, we can reformulate 
5 Moreover, I assume in the presented cases that the beliefs that the detective 
and the scientist form are not based on any kind of inference to the best explanation 
that might involve a truth connection.
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the case of O such that she simply does not have good enough reasons 
to believe, based on an intuitive understanding of good enough reasons.
O bases her belief on a defective belief forming process. However, 
do we really want to admit that she does not know? If O knows, her 
knowledge is not ideal with respect to the involved belief forming pro-
cesses. If one accepts fallible justiﬁ cation or warrant, then warrant and 
justiﬁ cation come in degrees. We have infallible justiﬁ cation on one end 
of the spectrum and the weakest possible evidence that still converts 
true beliefs into knowledge on the other end, and numerous forms of 
justiﬁ cation or warrant in between. In this case, we are inclined to ac-
cept non-ideal knowledge with respect to justiﬁ cation and warrant. But 
if we accept non-ideal knowledge in one respect, why should we exclude 
non-ideal knowledge in another respect, i.e. with respect to the belief 
forming process? In what follows, I will present various counterintui-
tive claims that follow from the assumption that O does not know.
Those who deny that O knows argue that she fails to know because of 
the defectiveness of her belief forming processes. If one accepts this view, 
then counterintuitive general claims of the following form can be true:
Ci1: S is convinced that p and S has proven that p, but S does not
   know that p.
In case of O, the following is true: 
Ci1O: O is convinced that O-particles exist and O has proven it, but 
   O does not know it. 
In this case, one has to accept that O believes a proposition and has 
proven the proposition to be true, and she does not know this proposi-
tion. One can increase the counter-intuitiveness of Ci1 and of the fol-
lowing claims by adding that S has not only proven that p, but that S 
is also aware of this fact.
Moreover, the counter-intuitiveness increases, if we consider the 
fact that it is O’s achievement or merit that she has proven her beliefs 
to be true (or that O is creditable for having proven that O). O did not 
stumble luckily across the evidence, but was searching intentionally 
and systematically for it. If she does not possess knowledge, then coun-
terintuitive claims of the following form can be true as well:
Ci2: S is convinced that p and S has proven that p and it is S’s merit 
  that S has proven that p, but S does not know that p.
In the case of O, the following is true: 
Ci2O: O is convinced that O-particles exist and O has proven it, and 
   this is her merit, but O does not know it. 
Claims of type Ci2 sound even more implausible than those of type Ci1. 
2. Contrasting persons
The claim the neither the inspector nor the scientist knows becomes 
even more problematic, if we contrast them with other persons to whom 
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those accounts ascribe knowledge, which at the same time deny that 
the inspector or the scientist know due to inappropriate belief forming 
processes. In the following, I will ﬁ rst contrast them with other experts 
and, second, with laypersons.
Let’s suppose that O has a colleague, professor P. O performs her 
experiment and convinces P that the sub-atomic particles exist and 
that they explain the physical phenomenon . As a result, P believes 
that O-particles exist. P is justiﬁ ed in believing it and P believes it be-
cause of the evidence. Therefore, those who argue that O does not know 
because her belief is not based on the evidence presumably admit that 
P knows.6 If one agrees with this view, then claims of the even more 
counterintuitive type can turn out to be true:
Ci3:  S1 is convinced that p and S1 has proven that p to S2, but S1 does 
   not know that p, whereas S2 does.
In the case of O, the following is then true:
Ci3O: O is convinced that O-particles exist and O has proven this to 
   professor P, but O does not know it, whereas P does.
In these cases, the persons who present the proof do not know, but 
their colleagues, to whom the evidence is presented, know. This seems 
controversial.
The cases of contrasting persons can be strengthened by taking lay-
persons as contrasting persons into account. Take for example school-
boy B who learns from a textbook that O-particles exist.7 If we admit 
that schoolboy B acquires knowledge this way because his beliefs are 
appropriately based, then the following counter-intuitive claims are 
also true:
Ci3O’: O is convinced that O-particles exist and O has proven it. 
   Schoolboy B learns from a textbook that O-particles exist, but 
   O does not know it, whereas B does.
These claims sound even more implausible. We can increase their im-
plausibility by assuming that O has the strongest possible evidence 
and understanding and the contrast person the weakest possible jus-
tiﬁ cation and understanding that turns an appropriately formed true 
belief into knowledge.
Moreover, we can suppose that B and everybody else would not 
know that O-particles exist, if O hadn’t proven it because if O hadn’t 
proven it nobody else would have proven it. In this respect, we can say 
that it is O’s merit that B knows that O-particles exist. In this case, 
instances of the following general claim are true:
6 We can construct a similar scenario for X, when she convinces colleague Y via 
presenting the evidence.
7 Analogously we can assume Granny G as contrasting layperson for inspector X, 
who is reading in the local newspaper that X has proven that Charming murdered 
his wife and believes this because of reading the newspaper.
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Ci4:  S1 is convinced that p and S1 has proven that p to S2, and S2 
   thereby comes to know that p and it is S1’s merit that S2 knows 
   that p, but S1 does not know that p.
In the case of O, the following is true: 
Ci4O: O is convinced that O-particles exist and O has proven it and 
   it is O’s merit that schoolboy B knows that O-particles exist, 
   but O does not know it.8
These claims seem very controversial. To make this point more explicit, 
consider the following dialogue between two physicists at the Nobel 
Prize ceremony: 
A:   O really deserves the Nobel Prize. Nobody believed that the 
   existence of a particle can explain the -phenomenon. She 
   was seeking for decisive evidence for years. Thanks to her, we 
   now understand this phenomenon and know that O-particles 
   exist.
B:  That’s true; it’s just a personal tragedy that O will never 
   know all this.
A:   Why not?
B:  Because she became obsessed with the idea that these particles 
   exist during her research.
A:   I see. What a pity.
We do not easily admit that those two physicists share a correct under-
standing of knowledge. Rather we are at least inclined to afﬁ rm that 
this is not clearly the case.9
3. Externalist knowledge accounts 
Externalist accounts of justiﬁ cation and knowledge share the view that 
appropriately forming or sustaining a belief is at least necessary for 
8 Lackey (2007 and 2009) argues that S can know that p without deserving credit 
for truly believing that p. If one goes with Lackey, then one can also suppose that 
schoolboy B knows without even deserving credit for it, which is a further contrast 
to the scientist, who deserve credit that B knows. Moreover, Lackey argues that a 
person S can know that p via testimony from a person T, although T does not know 
that p. Lackey (2008) presents the case of Stella, a teacher who believes in the truth 
of creationism and in the falsity of evolutionary theory. Nevertheless, Stella carries 
out her duty and teaches evolutionary theory at school. Lackey argues that Stella 
does not know that evolutionary theory is true, although her students can know via 
Stella’s reliable testimony that evolutionary theory is true. Thus, one might think 
that the case of professor O and schoolboy B is just an instance of Lackey’s case 
and not particularly problematic. Notably, the two cases are different. Stella fails to 
know that evolutionary theory is true because she fails to believe it. O, in contrast, 
believes that O particles exist and acknowledges the evidence for it. O just fails to 
believe for the ‘right’ reason. 
9 Notably A and B take O’s strange belief-forming process explicitly into account. 
Still, their rejection of knowledge seems false. Hence, the counter-intuitiveness of 
Ci1O-Ci4O is not based on the fact that they do not mention O’s strange belief-
forming process.
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having knowledge. Process reliabilism is the view that beliefs have to 
result from processes that reliably produce true beliefs, sensitivity and 
safety principles interpret the belief forming process modally, and vir-
tue epistemologists claim that the belief has to result from an agent’s 
epistemic virtues. In what follows, I will argue brieﬂ y, why externalist 
accounts are committed to strongly afﬁ rming Ci1 and Ci2 and presum-
ably also Ci3 and Ci4. I will not offer a complete selection of all external-
ist accounts defending a basing relation as a necessary component of 
knowledge; I only focus on some of the most prominent, selecting the 
best-known representatives of these accounts.
3.1. Knowledge without reliability
Process reliabilism is (or at least was) more concerned with epistemic 
justiﬁ cation than with knowledge. Goldman (1979: 9) argues that “cor-
rect principles of justiﬁ ed beliefs must be principles that make causal 
requirements, where “cause” is constructed broadly to include sustain-
ers as well as initiators of beliefs (i.e., processes that determine, or help 
to overdetermine, a belief’s continuing to be held).” Goldman notes that 
belief-forming processes that are intuitively justiﬁ cation-conferring 
share reliability, but that faulty belief forming processes do not. Gold-
man (1979: 10) concludes that the “justiﬁ cational status of a belief is 
a function of the reliability of the process or processes that cause it, 
where […] reliability consists in the tendency of a process to produce 
beliefs that are true rather than false.” The ﬁ rst version of reliability 
that Goldman considers is the following:
S’s believing p at t is justiﬁ ed if and only if S’s believing p at t re-
sults from a reliable belief-forming process (or set of processes).
This version captures the core idea of process reliabilism. O holds and 
sustains her beliefs as a result of her intuitions, which are not reliable 
belief forming processes. Therefore, these beliefs are not justiﬁ ed ac-
cording to process reliabilism. Hence, Goldman’s account implies the 
counter-intuitive claims Ci1 and Ci2 reformulated for justiﬁ ed beliefs. 
Moreover, suppose that the processes leading to schoolboy B’s belief 
are reliable since the textbooks are reliable sources. Hence, reliabilists 
would admit that B has justiﬁ ed beliefs and that the counterintuitive 
claims Ci3 and Ci4 reformulated for justiﬁ ed beliefs hold as well.
Goldman (1979) notes that beliefs may be over-determined in the 
sense that they may have a number of distinct ancestral trees. He ad-
mits that they need not all be full of reliable or conditionally reliable 
processes, but at least one ancestral tree must have reliable or con-
ditionally reliable processes throughout. However, the case of profes-
sor O can easily be formulated in way that her belief is not causally 
over-determined, since it is exclusively caused and causally sustained 
by her intuitions, which are not reliable processes. Hence, there is no 
ancestral tree that has reliable processes throughout.
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The only possible way for reliabilism to avoid the conclusion that O 
does not have justiﬁ ed beliefs that comes to my mind is to claim that O 
acquires a second belief when performing the experiment for the ﬁ rst 
time. This second belief would be the result of reliable belief-forming 
processes, and, hence they would be justiﬁ ed. But this is not a viable 
way for reliabilists: If they claim ad hoc that anybody with appropriate 
evidence acquires a second belief, then these beliefs are not primarily 
characterized by the quality of the belief forming processes anymore, 
but by the quality of the evidence the person has.
Goldman regards his original version of reliabilism as unsatisfac-
tory and later reﬁ ned it in various ways by adding further conditions as 
necessary for justiﬁ ed believing.10 However, the belief forming process-
es of O are simply unreliable and, therefore, they violate the core idea 
of process reliabilism. They fail to fulﬁ l at least one necessary condition 
for justiﬁ ed believing, and in some cases, they fail to fulﬁ l additional 
conditions as well. Hence, these reﬁ ned versions of reliabilism also im-
ply the truth of the counter-intuitive claims Ci1 and Ci2 for justiﬁ ed 
beliefs. Moreover, one can easily modify the case of B in a way that B’s 
belief fulﬁ ls all the conditions for justiﬁ ed believing. As a result, these 
reﬁ ned versions of process reliabilism also imply Ci3 and Ci4 for justi-
ﬁ ed beliefs.11
3.2. Knowledge without sensitivity 
Nozick (1981) interprets knowledge modally. As a ﬁ rst approximation, 
he deﬁ nes that S knows p iff (1) p is true; (2) S believes that p; (3) If p 
weren’t true, S wouldn’t believe that p; and (4) If p were true, S would 
believe that p. Each of the premises (1)–(4) constitute a necessary con-
dition for knowledge. Condition (3), which is the crucial one for most 
purposes, is often called the sensitivity requirement. In a further step, 
Nozick (1981: 179) deﬁ nes knowing via a method as follows:
S knows, via method (or way of believing) M, that p:
10 Goldman (1979: 20) adds as a further condition for justiﬁ cation to mere 
reliability that “there is no reliable or conditionally reliable process available to S 
which, had it been used by S in addition to the process actually used, would have 
resulted in S’s not believing p at t.” In Epistemology and Cognition (1986: 111f), 
Goldman adds a negative higher-order condition in the form of a non-undermining 
condition according to which a cognizer cannot be justiﬁ ed, if she does have reason to 
believe that her ﬁ rst-order belief isn’t reliably caused. For further variants of process 
reliabilism and its connection to related accounts see Goldman (2011).
11 Plantinga (1993) regards reliability as a necessary, but not as a sufﬁ cient 
condition for justiﬁ cation or for the third condition of knowledge beyond true 
belief, which he calls “warrant”. He introduces the notion of proper function which 
implies the existence of a design plan. Bergmann (2006) offers a modiﬁ ed version 
of Plantinga’s account of warrant, but also defends reliability as necessary for 
knowledge. Hence, those following Plantinga or Bergmann must accept Ci1 and Ci2 
as well.
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(1) p is true.
(2) S believes, via method or way of coming to believe M, that p.
(3) If p weren’t true and S were to use M to arrive at a belief whether 
  (or not) p, then S wouldn’t believe, via M, that p.
(4) If p were true and S were to use M to arrive at a belief whether 
  (or not) p, then S would believe, via M, that p.
Notably, Nozick explicitly deals with the question of causal over-deter-
mination, which is relevant for the case of O. He discusses the case of a 
father, who believes that his son is innocent of committing a particular 
crime via two methods, namely because of faith in his son and because 
of a conclusive demonstration in the courtroom.12 This case is similar 
to the ones of obsessed knowledge. Nozick argues that the father does 
only know if the good method outweighs the defective method. If per-
sons come to believe that p via two or more distinct methods, then the 
modal features of the “dominant” method that outweighes all other 
methods determines whether the person knows. Nozick (1981: 182) 
captures this idea as following:
S knows that p if and only if there is a method M such that (a) he 
knows that p via M, his belief via M that p satisﬁ es conditions 1–4, 
and (b) all other methods M1 via which he believes that p that do not 
satisfy conditions 1–4 are outweighed by M.
Nozick (1981: 182) deﬁ nes outweighing methods as following:
[M]ethod M is outweighed by others if when M would have the per-
son believe p, the person believes not-p if the other methods would 
lead to the belief that not-p, or when M would have the person be-
lieve not-p, the person believes p if the other methods would lead to 
the belief that p.
The case of the scientist O is set up in way that there is no causal rela-
tion between O’s belief and the evidence for this belief. However, let’s 
suppose, for the sake of the argument that O believes that the particles 
exist via her intuition and via the experiment. Her belief via the ex-
periment satisﬁ es Nozick’s conditions 1–4.13 Hence, O knows via the ex-
periment. O knows according to Nozick, if and only if all other methods 
via which she believes that the particles exist are outweighed by the 
experiment. O also believes via her intuition, but her intuition clearly 
violates conditions (3) and (4): If the particles did not exist and O were 
to use her intuition to arrive at a belief whether (or not) they exist, then 
S would still believe, via her intuition, that they exist. Therefore, condi-
tion (3) is not satisﬁ ed. Therefore, O only knows, according to Nozick, if 
12 Nozick refers for this example to Armstrong (1973).
13 This is the case because (1), the theory is true, (2), O believes the theory via 
the experiment, (3), if the theory weren’t true and O were to use the experiment to 
arrive at a belief whether (or not) the theory is true, then O wouldn’t believe, via the 
experiment, that the theory is true, and, (4), if the theory were true and O were to 
use the experiment to arrive at a belief whether (or not) the theory is true, then S 
would believe, via the experiment, that the theory is true.
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her intuition is outweighed by the experiment. This would be the case 
if: when O’s intuition would lead to the belief that the particles exist, 
O would nevertheless not believe this if the experiment showed that 
such particles do not exist. However, this condition is not satisﬁ ed for 
O since she would believe according to what her intuitions tell her, no 
matter what results the experiment gains. Therefore, O’s intuitions are 
not outweighed by the experiment and O does not know according to 
Nozick. Thus, Nozick’s deﬁ nition of knowledge implies the truth of Ci1 
and Ci2.
Moreover, one can easily reformulate the case of schoolboy B in a 
way that his beliefs fulﬁ l Nozick’s reﬁ ned concept of knowledge, either 
by supposing that he only believes via one method which is reading 
the textbook or by supposing that all other methods are outweighed by 
this method. In these cases, the counterfactual conditionals Ci3 and Ci4 
hold as well.
3.3. Knowledge without safety
Sensitivity accounts of knowledge have been criticised in various 
ways.14 Sosa (1999) suggests replacing sensitivity by the alternative 
modal principle safety, which he deﬁ nes as following:
Call a belief by S that p “safe” iff: S would believe that p only if it 
were so that p.
(Alternatively, a belief by S that p is “safe” iff: S would not believe 
that p without it being the case that p; or, better, iff: as a matter of 
fact, though perhaps not as a matter of strict necessity, not easily 
would S believe that p without it being the case that p.)
Safety In order to (be said correctly to) constitute knowledge 
a belief must be safe (rather than sensitive). (Sosa 1999: 142)
Sosa points out that sensitivity and safety are not equivalent, since 
subjunctive conditionals do not contrapose. Safety is a modal principle. 
Therefore, one can formulate it by using the notion of possible worlds. 
Pritchard (2007: 81) formulates the safety principle as following:
(SP) S’s belief is safe iff in most near-by possible worlds in which S 
continues to form her belief about the target proposition in the same 
way as in the actual world the belief continues to be true.15
14 Some argue that the fact that sensitivity excludes knowledge-closure shows 
that sensitivity has to be false. See for example Williamson (2000). For inﬂ uential 
criticisms see Vogel (1987) and Sosa (1999). For recent criticisms of sensitivity 
accounts of knowledge see Melchior (2014a, 2014b and 2015).
15 For a similar formulation see Pritchard (2005: 156). Pritchard (2007: 283) also 
considers strengthening the safety principle by demanding that the agent’s belief 
has to be true not just in most of the relevant nearby possible worlds, but in nearly 
all (if not all) of them. Fur a further variant of the safety principle see Pritchard 
(2007: 292). Sosa (2007) later replaced his initial concept of safety by basis-relative 
safety which relativizes safety to a belief forming method as Pritchard’s principle 
(SP) does. Pritchard’s (2005 and 2007) starting point of his anti-luck epistemology is 
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What about the safety principle and the case of the scientist? Her be-
liefs are only based on her intuitions which do not stand in any causal 
relation to the part of the actual world that makes them true. Hence, it 
is easily possible that she still has her beliefs on the basis of her intu-
itions, although her beliefs are false. It is not the case that the scientist 
would believe that the particles exist, only if they did exist; as a matter 
of fact, she would easily believe this without it being the case. There-
fore, the scientist’s belief is not safe according to Sosa’s formulation. 
But since a belief must be safe in order to constitute knowledge, she 
does not know. The scientist also violates Pritchard’s safety principle 
(SP), since not in most nearby possible worlds in which she continues to 
form her beliefs based on her intuitions her beliefs continue to be true. 
Pritchard (2007: 289 and 2009a) explicitly states that safety is neces-
sary for knowledge. Therefore, he is forced to admit, as Sosa is, that the 
obsessed scientist does not know and that Ci1 and Ci2 hold.
16
What about the contrasting person schoolboy B? Let’s take the 
safety principle (SP) as example. There are possible worlds, where B 
continues to form his beliefs the same way as in the actual world, but 
his beliefs are false. These can be possible worlds where O-particles do 
not exist, but one of the textbook authors mistakenly reports that they 
do. Whether B knows in the actual world depends on whether such pos-
sible worlds are nearby. If they are nearby and if there are sufﬁ ciently 
many of them, then B’s belief is not safe according to (SP) and he fails 
to have knowledge. However, if one regards these worlds as nearby, 
then knowledge acquisition by reading the textbooks is excluded in 
general. However, excluding this kind of testimonial knowledge in gen-
eral seems an unwanted consequence of safety. Hence, those defending 
safety as the core principle of knowledge face a dilemma: they either 
must deny testimonial knowledge or accept that schoolboy B knows 
and that, therefore, the counterintuitive claims Ci3 and Ci4 are true 
as well.17
the common sense claim that knowledge excludes luck. His conception of non-lucky 
beliefs is closely related to the safety principle, i.e. a belief is non-lucky iff it is safe.
16 One could argue that any possible world where O-particles do not exist is 
already far off, since its physical consistency is different from the one of the actual 
world. In this case, we can take the case of inspector X into account, (or other cases 
of knowledge by obsession) where this kind of problem does not arise.
17 Interestingly, Pritchard (2007: 279) also considers the case of a prejudiced 
detective. In accordance with his anti-luck epistemology he explicitly claims that 
the detective does not know: “Suppose, for instance, that it was only a matter of luck 
that the detective stumbled across the crucial piece of evidence which proves the 
defendant’s guilt. So long as her resultant true belief in the defendant’s guilt is not 
lucky, then this poses no problem for the claim that she knows what she believes. 
In contrast, suppose her belief was only luckily true—suppose, for example, that her 
belief was based on prejudice rather than evidence, but was true nonetheless—then 
this would be inconsistent with her possessing knowledge in this regard.” Pritchard 
uses his example for pointing out that his main worry is luck in the truth of the 
relevant belief and not the luck in coming across evidence. 
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3.4. Williamson on reliability and safety 
Williamson regards reliability as a necessary condition for knowledge. 
“No reason has emerged to doubt the intuitive claim that reliability is 
necessary for knowledge” (Williamson 2000: 100). Williamson (2000: 
123) understands reliability and unreliability as modal states like sta-
bility and instability. He thinks that safety is the crucial instance of 
reliability, which is a necessary condition for knowledge.18 Williamson 
(2000: 128) explains the relations between knowledge and safety as 
following:
Now assume a connection between knowledge and safety from error 
[…] For all cases Ǐ and ǐ, if ǐ is close to Ǐ and in Ǐ one knows that C 
obtains, then in ǐ one does not falsely believe that C obtains.
However, Williamson famously reverses the orthodox direction of ex-
planation dominant in epistemology. In his “knowledge ﬁ rst” methodol-
ogy, Williamson (2000: v) takes the simple distinction between knowl-
edge and ignorance as a starting point from which to explain other 
things, not as something itself to be explained. According to William-
son, we must use our understanding of knowledge for explaining safety 
and not the other way round. Consequently, Williamson argues that we 
have to use our understanding of knowledge to determine whether the 
similarity to a case of error is great enough in a given case to exclude 
knowledge. Consequently Williamson (2009: 305) suggests that in 
“many cases, someone with no idea of what knowledge is would be un-
able to determine whether safety obtained. … One may have to decide 
whether safety obtains by ﬁ rst deciding whether knowledge obtains, 
rather than vice versa.”
In order to handle the case of professor O and schoolboy B, William-
son cannot rely on deﬁ ned notions of safety in determining whether 
they know, since he inverted the direction of explanation. Therefore, 
his starting point has to be a judgement about whether O and whether 
B knows. There are four possible cases:
Case (1): O knows and B knows.
Case (2): O knows and B does not know.
Case (3): O does not know and B knows.
Case (4): O does not know and B does not know.
However, each of these four cases is problematic for Williamson’s ac-
count.
Case (1): This case seems the desired result given our intuitions. 
Since safety is, according to Williamson, a necessary condition for 
knowledge, no possible world where O falsely believes is close. Hence, a 
world which is exactly the same as the actual world except the fact that 
O had false intuitions is already far off. But such a restrictive concept 
of closeness implies an extremely loose concept of safety according to 
18 See Williamson (2000, 124). For a discussion on Williamson’s account of 
reliability and safety see also Goldman (2009) and Williamson (2009).
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which nearly any belief is safe and safety is not a useful criterion for 
knowledge anymore. In this case, Williamson’s claim that safety is nec-
essary for knowledge becomes inoperable.
Case (2): In this case, the same problematic consequences as in case 
(1) follow from the claim that O knows. Moreover, the claim that B does 
not know seems ad hoc, unless we abandon any kind of testimonial 
knowledge in general.
Case (3): In this case Williamson can make use of an plausible ac-
count of safety according to which O does not know for the reason that 
her belief is not safe but B knows and, therefore, has safe beliefs. How-
ever, the problem of case (3) is simply that Williamson is committed to 
accepting all counterintuitive claims Ci1-Ci4.
Case (4): On the one hand, this case is less problematic than case 
(3) since it only implies Ci1 and Ci2, but not the even more counterintui-
tive claims Ci3 and Ci4. On the other hand, it is–as in case (2)–ad hoc 
to claim that B does not know, if we do not abandon any kind of testi-
monial knowledge.
At ﬁ rst sight, Williamson might seem to be in a better position than 
those who deﬁ ne knowledge in terms of reliability, sensitivity or safety 
because he need not deny that the detective and the scientist know. But 
at a closer look, his alternatives are not less problematic.
3.5. Knowledge without virtue
Important variants of virtue epistemology are version of epistemic ex-
ternalism. While process reliabilism focuses on features of the belief 
forming process, virtue epistemologists mainly focus on features of the 
believing person. They claim that knowledge has to be the result of a 
truth-conductive intellectual virtue. Greco argues that simple process 
reliabilism is too weak. Greco (2000: 177) suggests replacing process 
reliabilism by the following position, which he calls “agent reliabilism”: 
A belief p has positive epistemic status for a person S just in case S’s 
believing p results from stable and reliable dispositions that make 
up S’s cognitive character.19
Sosa (2007: 23) regards knowledge as apt performances. Any perfor-
mance with an aim can have the AAA structure “accuracy: reaching the 
aim; adroitness: manifesting skills or competences; and aptness: reach-
ing the aim through the adroitness manifest.” Sosa (2007: 23) regards 
beliefs as performances which fall under this AAA structure. “We can 
distinguish between a belief’s accuracy, i.e., its truth; its adroitness, 
i.e., its manifesting epistemic virtue or competence; and its aptness, 
i.e., its being true because competent.” Sosa distinguishes between ani-
mal knowledge and reﬂ ective knowledge, a more demanding higher-
level knowledge. Leaving the word “knows” undeﬁ ned, Sosa (2007: 24) 
19 The same deﬁ nition can be found in Greco (1999: 287–88). For Greco’s more 
recent formulation see also Greco (2010). 
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formulates the core idea of his virtue epistemology as follows.
(a) afﬁ rm that knowledge entails belief;
(b) understand “animal” knowledge as requiring apt belief without 
requiring defensibly apt belief, i.e., apt belief that the subject aptly 
believes to be apt, and whose aptness the subject can therefore de-
fend against relevant skeptical doubts; and
(c) understand “reﬂ ective” knowledge as requiring not only apt be-
lief also defensibly apt belief.
One can easily argue that the obsessed scientist fails to know by adopt-
ing one of these virtue epistemologist approaches. It has been assumed 
that the scientist’s intuitions are unreliable belief forming processes 
and, therefore, not reliable dispositions of her character as Greco’s 
agent reliabilism demands. Therefore, she does not know according to 
Greco. If one accepts Sosa’s virtue epistemology one must admit that 
the beliefs are accurate because true. It might be subject to debate 
whether they manifest any epistemic virtue or competence and wheth-
er they are, therefore adroit. However, their accurateness does not 
manifest their adroitness and therefore, they fail to be apt. Hence, Sosa 
and his followers must confess that O fails to have animal knowledge, 
and, therefore, also reﬂ ective knowledge. Hence, virtue epistemological 
accounts such as Greco’s agent reliabilism or Sosa’s virtue epistemol-
ogy imply that the detective and the scientist do not know and that the 
counterintuitive claims Ci1 and Ci2 are true.
20
Moreover, one can easily suppose that the beliefs of schoolboy B 
result from the stable and reliable dispositions to consult serious text-
books and that these dispositions make up his cognitive character and 
that, therefore, his beliefs have a positive epistemic status as Greco 
demands. Moreover, his beliefs are according to Sosa accurate because 
true, they are adroit since they manifest epistemic virtues or compe-
tences, and they are apt, since they are true because competent. Hence, 
B acquires animal knowledge by studying the textbook. Moreover, he 
can also acquire reﬂ ective knowledge if his apt belief is also defensible 
e.g. against the objection that the textbook is not reliable. Hence, virtue 
epistemological accounts such as the presented ones not only imply the 
counterfactual claims Ci1 and Ci2, but also the more problematic claims 
Ci3 and Ci4.
21
To sum up: Inspector X’s and professor O’s beliefs are neither caused 
nor causally sustained by a reliable belief forming process. They are 
insensitive and unsafe and they do not result from an epistemic virtue 
20 Assuming that the obsessed persons form a second belief when acquiring 
evidence fails to be a viable way for the same reasons as for process reliabilists.
21 Pritchard recently changed his view that safety alone converts true beliefs 
into knowledge. Pritchard (2009a and 2009b) still defends the necessity of safety 
to an analysis of knowledge, but he thinks that an ability condition of some sort 
has to be added. Pritchard (2009a) and (2012) now argues that this antiluck virtue 
epistemology is the right theory of knowledge. However, this account gains the same 
results with regard to professor O and schoolboy B.
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such as stable and reliable dispositions or aptness. Hence, everybody 
who defends one of these externalist accounts of justiﬁ cation or knowl-
edge is committed to accepting the problematic claims Ci1 and Ci2. 
Moreover, defenders of these externalist accounts are presumably com-
mitted to accepting the even more controversial claims Ci3 and Ci4 too.
Characteristically, externalist accounts of knowledge and justiﬁ ca-
tion do not demand any believer knowledge about the reliability of the 
belief forming source. Hence, B can acquire knowledge and justiﬁ ed be-
liefs by simply believing what the textbook tells him and without hav-
ing any further information about the textbook at all. In all externalist 
cases, the low standards for knowledge and justiﬁ cation with respect 
to meta-knowledge conﬂ ict with the high standards with respect to the 
belief forming process that exclude O from knowing.
Notably, problems for externalist knowledge accounts not only arise 
if Ci3 and Ci4 clearly turn out to be false. They already arise if they do 
not clearly turn out to be true. Professor O clearly fails to fulﬁ l any 
externalist criterion for knowledge and schoolboy B clearly fulﬁ ls these 
criteria. Thus, there should not be any doubts about the truth of Ci3 
and Ci4 according to externalist knowledge accounts. However, this 
does not seem to be the case. Rather Ci3 and Ci4 are at least controver-
sial borderline cases of knowledge.
Defenders of externalist knowledge accounts could simply argue 
that their accounts are true and, therefore, Ci1-Ci4 are also true and 
that there is no problem at all. However, this is not a viable strategy, 
if theories of knowledge shall also explain our pre-theoretical under-
standing of knowledge. Given this is aim, theories of knowledge have 
to deliver results that resemble our intuitions whether persons know in 
particular cases and this is not the case, if theories of knowledge clearly 
imply that Ci1-Ci4 are true.
I think one persisting intuition about the cases of X and O is that 
they do not know until they discovers the evidence, but that they know 
after having discovered it. However, this intuition cannot be captured 
by any of these externalist accounts. If X and O clearly know, then 
these cases of baseless knowledge provide direct counter-examples 
against externalist knowledge accounts. However, I am not convinced 
that they clearly know. Rather it seems prima facie disputable whether 
we should ascribe knowledge to them. However, this controversy about 
the question whether X and O know already confronts externalist 
knowledge accounts with a problem. X and O clearly do not fulﬁ l any 
externalist criteria, i.e. their beliefs are to no extend reliably formed or 
safe and they are clearly not sensitive or apt. Thus, these externalist 
accounts have it that X or O undoubtedly does not know. They are in no 
way borderline cases of knowledge according to externalism. However, 
our intuition seems to be that it is at least subject of discussion wheth-
er they know. In this respect, externalist accounts do not adequately 
capture our intuitions about knowledge.
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4. Lehrer’s gypsy lawyer
The two examples for baseless knowledge presented here are similar to 
Lehrer’s gypsy-lawyer cases. Lehrer (1971 and 1974) presents the case 
of a gypsy lawyer who proves his client’s innocence via a complicated 
line of reasoning, though his conviction that his client is innocent is 
completely based on reading the cards. Lehrer concludes that the law-
yer knows that his client is innocent, although his belief is in no way 
caused by his evidence.22 Lehrer argues against any causal interpreta-
tion of the basing relation. Lehrer (1990) claims that the reason a per-
son has for believing something must not be confused with the cause of 
her believing it. He calls this confusion the causal fallacy.
There are similarities and differences between Lehrer’s cases of the 
gypsy lawyer and the racist on the one hand and the case of the ob-
sessed scientist on the other hand. In each of the cases the evidence in 
no way explains, causes or causally sustains the beliefs. So much for 
the similarities. However, Lehrer’s examples and the cases of obsessed 
knowledge diverge in important respects. First, we tend to evaluate the 
causes of holding these beliefs differently. Reading the cards and be-
ing a racist are elements of superstition or prejudices which we regard 
as the opposite of enlightenment and knowledge. At least in our cul-
tural context we tend to have a negative attitude towards superstition 
and racial prejudices and a positive one towards enlightenment and 
knowledge. The case of intuitions, in contrast, is less clear. In certain 
contexts such as scientiﬁ c discoveries we tend to evaluate the epistemic 
status of intuitions someway positively, by saying that someone was 
kissed, touched or inspired by the muse or had a divine inspiration, 
even if we admit that intuitions are not a reliable guide to truth. From 
this point of view, one can say that O had a genius moment, when she 
ﬁ rst came to believe that particles explain the -phenomenon, although 
her intuitions did not produce true beliefs in other cases. Being super-
stitious as the gypsy lawyer or being generally prejudiced as the racist 
is inconsistent with having knowledge in a way that being inspired by 
the muse or having a divine inspiration is not. I do not claim that phe-
nomena such as inspiration already constitute instances of knowledge. 
I only argue that they do not prima facie rule out knowledge.
The second distinction between Lehrer’s examples and the case of 
the obsessed scientist concerns the inter-personal and, hence, social 
aspects. O not only proves her convictions for her own concerns, she 
also proves it to others. Hence, it is not only her merit that she knows, 
but also her merit that others know. Moreover, O might have a much 
better understanding of the evidence and how it is related to the proven 
theories than those persons to whom she proves it. By only focusing 
O’s beliefs and on Ci1 and Ci2, we might just create new versions of 
22 Lehrer (1990) presents a similar example of a racist, who has scientiﬁ c evidence 
that only members of some race are susceptible to some disease, but who believes 
this only because of his racial prejudices.
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gypsy-lawyer cases, but by taking contrasting persons and Ci3 and Ci4 
into account, the case against the basing relation receives new support. 
Lehrer’s own cases could have been reconstructed along these lines, but 
to the best of my knowledge, this hasn’t been done yet.23
Third, Lehrer wants to argue against externalist knowledge ac-
counts by arguing that baseless knowledge exists. I take a weaker posi-
tion concerning the existence of baseless knowledge. I only claim that it 
is controversial whether X and O know. However, this weaker position 
already sufﬁ ces for pointing out that pure externalist knowledge ac-
counts do not always capture our intuitions about knowledge.
5. Overdetermination and pseudo-overdetermination
There are two possible lines of objection against the claim that O pos-
sesses baseless knowledge; ﬁ rst, that she does not possess knowledge 
at all. All those who defend one of the externalist knowledge accounts 
sketched above take this line.24 They are committed to accepting Ci1 
and Ci2 and typically committed to accepting Ci3 and Ci4 as well. Tak-
ing the second line of objection means to argue that O possesses knowl-
edge, but that it is not baseless. In this case, one has to argue that even 
in the cases of O there is a kind of causal relation between the beliefs 
and the evidence that justiﬁ es the belief. One way of defending this 
claim is to argue that O’s belief is causally overdetermined because 
it is caused or causally sustained by her intuitions and her evidence. 
However, the case of O is constructed in a way that her beliefs are only 
caused and causally sustained by her intuitions. Even after ﬁ nding evi-
dence, her beliefs are in no respect caused or causally sustained by this 
evidence. In this respect, her beliefs are not causally overdetermined.25 
Swain (1981) argues that the belief of the gypsy lawyer and conse-
quently also the belief of O are pseudo-overdetermined. He claims in 
accordance with Lehrer that the gypsy lawyer knows that his client is 
innocent, but against Lehrer, he argues that the lawyer’s belief in the 
innocence of his client is still based on the complicated line of reasoning. 
Swain argues that the lawyer’s belief is pseudo-overdetermined by the 
line of reasoning and, hence, based on it because the reasoning would 
23 Interestingly, in his example of the gypsy lawyer Lehrer (1974: 124) denies 
that the lawyer convinces others by demonstrating his justifying line of evidence, 
and assumes that the others, “impressed by the similarity of the crimes and eager 
to believe that the agent of them all has been apprehended, refuse to accept the 
lawyer’s cogent reasoning.” 
24 This line is also the most popular reaction to Lehrer’s gypsy lawyer case. See 
for example Harman (1973), Pollock (1986) or Audi (1993).
25 Goldman (1979) for example notes that beliefs may be over-determined in the 
sense that they may have a number of distinct ancestral trees. He admits that they 
need not all be full of reliable or conditionally reliable processes, but at least one 
ancestral tree must have reliable or conditionally reliable processes throughout. 
However, the cases of X and O are formulated in a way that there is no ancestral 
tree that has reliable processes throughout. 
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have caused the lawyer’s belief, if the card reading had not caused it. 
One can argue analogously that O’s belief is pseudo-overdetermined 
because the evidence resulting from the experiment would have caused 
O’s belief, if her intuition had not caused it.
Swain’s account of the basing relation has been criticized by various 
authors. Kvanvig (1985) argues that we can reformulate the case of the 
gypsy lawyer in a way that his belief does not fulﬁ l Swain’s criterion of 
pseudo-overdetermination. This can be achieved, for example, by sup-
posing that if the card reading did not cause his belief that his client 
is innocent, then he would consult a fortune teller, and the evidence 
would still not cause his belief. In this case, the gypsy lawyer’s is not 
pseudo-overdetermined and, therefore, he does not know according to 
Swain. Similar counterfactual scenarios can be formulated for O. For 
example, one can suppose that O would believe that O-particles exist 
because of religious faith, if she did not have her intuition. In this case, 
in the nearest possible worlds where O’s belief is not caused by her 
intuition, it is still not caused by the experiment, and consequently O’s 
belief is not pseudo-overdetermined.26
6. Conclusion
Most accounts of knowledge, especially externalist accounts, share the 
view that the appropriateness of the way that a true belief is caused 
or causally sustained is a necessary condition for knowledge. These 
accounts are committed to accepting that the obsessed scientist and 
the obsessed detective clearly fail to know. This is counter-intuitive if 
we ascribe to them other epistemic virtues such as full understanding 
or praiseworthiness for proving what they believe to others. The view 
that they clearly do not know becomes even more counter-intuitive if 
we consider contrasting persons who know because of appropriate be-
lief forming processes but who fail to possess further epistemic virtues. 
The conclusion is a moderate one: the appropriateness of the belief-
forming process can be one aspect of knowledge among others. The 
obsessed scientist and the obsessed detective are in one respect not 
ideal epistemic agents, but so are the contrasting persons who possess 
weaker understanding than the scientist and the detective and who ac-
quire evidence quite accidentally. Appropriate belief forming processes 
may be necessary, sufﬁ cient, or necessary and sufﬁ cient for knowledge 
in many contexts, but it is dubitable whether they are a necessary con-
dition in all contexts. Any externalist knowledge account that regards 
a correct belief forming method as necessary in all contexts seems too 
restrictive.
26 Furthermore, Tolliver (1982) argues against Swain that according to his 
account, a belief that p could cause a belief that q, nevertheless the belief that q 
could pseudo-overdetermine the belief that p, which is an unacceptable consequence 
of Swain’s account.
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